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When one party is encumbered with a liability, it will often look for another party to assume some of the costs. One method of forcing costs to be shared by another is to have a joint venturer contribute. Not surprisingly, when a liability arises, the liable party will be liberal in its interpretation of who among its relationships is a joint venturer, while a potential contributor will be conservative in its interpretation. Thus, it is important to identify analytical tools to determine if a joint venture exists. The first section of this article discusses the core legal elements of a joint venture and presents basic techniques for determining its existence. The second section discusses the majority view regarding the relationship between joint ventures and the corporations created to effect their purposes; the New York and New Jersey exception (the "Exception") to that view; and the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Exception. Under the Exception, which can potentially determine cost allocation, a valid joint venture and attendant liabilities cease to exist once the joint venture incorporates. The Second Circuit's interpretation has essentially permitted the rule to consume the Exception.
I. JOINT VENTURES
A. Definition
Although descriptions ofjoint ventures have varied and courts have been reluctant to formulate a precise definition of the term, some common elements in courts' treatment of joint ventures exist.' "A joint [ ]venture,' as a legal concept, is of comparative [ly] recent origin and is founded entirely on contract, either express or implied." 2 In addition to a contract asserting the creation of ajoint venture, courts often require that certain elements be present in the relationship to find that a joint venture exists. 3 Although its existence depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, and while no definite rules have been promulgated which will apply generally to all situations, the decisions are in substantial agreement that the following factors must be present: (a) A contribution by the parties of money, property, effort, knowledge, skill or other asset to a common undertaking; (b) A joint property interest in the subject matter of the venture; (c) A right of mutual control or management of the enterprise; (d) Expectation of profit, or the presence of "adventure," as it is sometimes called; (e) A right to participate in the profits; [and] (f) Most usually, limitation of the objective to a single undertaking or ad hoc enterprise. 4 Accordingly, if disputes arise as to the existence of a joint venture contract, courts may look to see if any of the additional requisites of a joint venture are present. As a logical matter, the presence of these typical elements will not satisfy the first requirement of the test (i.e., a contract). As a practical matter, however, their presence allows courts to infer the existence of the joint venture contract. This "leap of faith" or "argument from existence" analysis, however, does not state that the essential elements prove the agreement, but simply implies that since the elements are there, the agreement must exist despite the fact that there is no independent evidence to support it. This distinction is of little comfort to practitioners who are less concerned about a court's reasoning than about its conclusion.
B. Ancillary Tools
The statute of frauds and tax laws could aid in determining whether or not ajoint venture was formed. Simply looking for the actual written joint venture contract or examining parties' tax returns could provide the added evidence necessary to determine if a joint venture exists.
It is a fundamental principle of contract law that when both sides reach an agreement as to the terms of a deal, they are bound regardless of whether the agreement is oral or written.' However, due to the many difficulties of enforcing oral agreements, most jurisdictions in the United States have enacted a statute of frauds, which requires that certain types of agreements be in writing in order to be enforceable. 6 These include, inter alia, contracts for 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) ("A promise may be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct."). the sale of land, agreements that will not be fully performed within one year, promises to answer for the debt of another, agreements modifying written contracts, contracts for the sale of goods in excess of $500, contracts for the sale of personal property in excess of $5,000, and contracts for the sale of securities.
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If a contract falls within ajurisdiction's statute of frauds, it will usually only be enforceable if the agreement is in writing and the writing specifies the parties and subject matter of the contract.' Accordingly, if the alleged joint venture falls within the scope of the statute of frauds, the absence of a written agreement could be evidence that ajoint venture does not exist. However, this analysis is of limited usefulness because of the lack of clarity as to the applicability of the statute of frauds tojoint venture agreements.
9 Moreover, the statute of frauds can also be satisfied by partial performance.
'° Thus, if a court finds evidence that the parties were acting as if they were bound by an agreement that would normally require a writing under the statute of frauds, the court may choose to enforce the agreement even absent a writing. partial performance, and the court may enforce the contract. 1 1 Additionally, joint ventures sound in partnership law and, thus, similar rules apply to both relationships when determining respective parties' obligations.
1 2 Federal tax law deems ajoint venture equivalent to a partnership and requires joint ventures to pay taxes as if they were partnerships." Thus, an examination of the parties' filings should provide evidence as to whether the participants intended to be joint venturers.
II. JOINT VENTURES AS CORPORATIONS
Whether the persons deciding to create an organization to effectuate a joint enterprise (the "organizing parties") properly follow the procedures of incorporation, and do in fact form a corporation, will not in itself determine the permanence of the joint venture. 4 The permanence will depend initially on whether the jurisdiction allows joint ventures to take the form of a corporation. If it does not, then the joint venture gives way to the corporate form and no confidential fiduciary duty exists among the shareholders. 15 Consequently, liability among the organizing parties is limited, and equitable claims, such as those for an accounting, cannot be brought by one of the former joint venturers (presently shareholders) against any of the others. If, however, the jurisdiction allows ajoint venture to take the form of a corporation, then the court must determine whether the organizing parties intended the joint venture to continue even after the enterprise in question was incorporated. 16 In this regard, the interposition of a corporation will not negate the existence of ajoint venture, "[b]ut it is an important consideration in that direction and will be conclusive in the absence of compelling factors to the contrary. " " If the jurisdiction allows joint ventures to take the form of a corporation, and both thejoint venture and the corporation are valid, then the parties to the joint venture shall be liable to each other asjoint venturers, while the incorporated venture shall have limited liability as to third parties." Indeed, the majority view is that, while a partnership may not take the form of a corporation, ajoint venture may. In these jurisdictions, individuals or corporations can form a corporation as a joint venture, resulting in limited liability as to third parties but not as between themselves.
9 Thus, whether the jurisdiction allows joint ventures to take the corporate form is critical. It will determine the type of liability that the relevant parties face.
A. The New York and New Jersey Exception
A minority of jurisdictions refuse to recognize as valid a joint venture in the form of a corporation. 2° In Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of America, 2 1 the New York Court of Appeals held that "the rule is well [-] settled that ajoint venture may not be carried on by individuals through a corporate form. ' 22 In its decision, the Weisman court relied on the New Jersey state case of Jackson v. Hooper. 2 In Jackson, the court held that it would violate public policy to allow a corporation to maintain the corporate veil against the public, but not allow its shareholders the same protection for disputes among 
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themselves. 2 4 Thus, these courts hold that once ajoint venture incorporates, thejoint venture ceases to exist and the parties become only shareholders. They are no longer fiduciaries to each other and no longer personally liable. A result is that the very powerful equitable relief available to partners and joint venturers, receipt of an accounting, is not available to the organizing parties.
B. The Second Circuit's View
The Macklem was decided at the trial level in 1955 before the Weisman opinion was issued, and affirmed in 1960 after Weisman was decided. To support its proposition that Macklem is distinguished from Weisman, the Arditi court cited the unattributed quote that the corporation was "merely * * [sic] an adjunct of a joint venture."3 2 This quote, however, does not appear in the Macklem opinion. The trial court in Macklem concluded that the parties did not intend to carry on the venture as stockholders in a corporation. Further, the court held that "[i] t is very likely, under the facts as developed at the trial, that were this an action brought by a creditor of [the parties to the joint venture] the 'corporate veil' would be 'pierced.'" 3 4 It also held that "[t]he incorporators were 'dummies' and apparently no corporate meetings were held and no stock issued,"" 5 and that the party seeking a distribution of stock was prohibited by state law from receiving stock for his services. 36 Although Macklem may provide support for the Arditi opinion, the irregularities with the corporation in question seem to have been critical to the court's analysis. As a result, the applicability of Macklem to cases involving valid corporations is dubious.
M.P.E. Holding Corp. and Loverdos clearly support Weisman, despite the Arditi court's reliance on them. Conversely, Fortugno provides some support, albeit limited, for Arditi. The Fortugno court, using equity, despite the "lack of precedent," held that the "partnership's stock ownership was not for the purpose of participating in corporate affairs in the normal manner, but was resorted to in order to simply make each corporation an instrumentality or department of the integrated family enterprise."" The Arditi court claimed to be following precedent when it cited Fortugno. 3 s Ironically, the Fortugno court disavowed the existence of any precedent on the issue. The Second Circuit further demonstrated how overreliance on, and the misapplication of, precedent can be detrimental in Sagamore Corp. v. Diamond West Energy Corp. 4 " Therein, the court again relied on unsupportive case law. The court indicated that almost as soon as the ink was dry on the Weisman opinion, the New York courts began to retreat from the rule laid out therein. 4 1 The parties in Sagamore validly formed a joint venture and then formed a corporation to effect the venture. 4 2 The court held that the rule in New York under such circumstances is that when parties to a joint venture merge the entire joint venture agreement into the corporation, the enterprise is governed by corporation law. 43 [Vol. 1:445 ever, when parties to a joint venture form a corporation to carry out one or more of the joint venture's objectives and intend the joint venture to exist along with the corporation, the rights and duties under the joint venture agreement still exist. 4 4 Like Arditi, the Sagamore rule is bifurcated. It allows joint venture obligations to exist after incorporation in some situations, but not others. However, the Sagamore rule appears more constrained than the one set out in Arditi. The Sagamore court seems only to allow the intervention of a corporation into a joint venture if the corporation has a limited focus. As in Arditi, the case law cited by the Sagamore court does not strongly support its holding. The Sagamore court relied on Ardit 4 5 and Macklem, 46 on four cases that held that a joint venture no longer exists when it is merged into the ensuing corporation, 4 7 and on two cases that the court contended demonstrate that ajoint venture and corporation can exist simultaneously. 48 The reliance by the Sagamore court on the above four cases as support for the claim that there is a bifurcated standard under New York law was misplaced. Two of these cases rest squarely on Weisman, which mandates the Exception and, therefore, does not allow for the bifurcated rule. 4 The Manacher court aptly summed up its decision as follows: "Individuals may enter into partnership agreements or joint ventures independent of the corporate form but they may not organize a corporation for the purpose of carrying on ajoint venture." 5 5
Thus, Manacher only appears to have provided for a qualification to the Exception in limited situations where ajoint venture has organized a corporation to effect one part of a multifaceted joint venture.
Finally As with previously discussed cases, Fromkin rests upon and supports Weisman. 6 " Triggs does not involve ajoint venture, but simply deals with an agreement between corporate shareholders regarding a stock purchase option. 6 1 Shapolsky involves a unique factual situation that seems to have dictated the outcome. In that case, plaintiff and his brother, the defendant, agreed to purchase real estate for speculation and to take title to such in the name of several corporations.
6 " Plaintiff contended that his brother never gave him stock certificates in the aforementioned corporations. The court merely held that this was not a derivative action, and plaintiff could maintain an action against his brother for the stock certificates, as plaintiffs right to recovery had its origin independent of and extrinsic to the corporate entity. 6 4 Finally, in a recent federal district court case in New York, Zahr v. Wingate, 6 5 the court explicitly followed Weisman and its progeny. Zahr, however, did not specifically address Arditi and Sagamore. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether the court, in properly following New York precedent, recognized its departure from the Second Circuit's view of the law.
III. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit should follow Zahr and its proper adherence to New York law. Weisman created the Exception whereby joint ventures could not incorporate, but the Second Circuit weakened the Exception to the point of virtual elimination. Like any United States Court of Appeals reviewing a district court's interpretation of state law, the Second Circuit is in a delicate position thrust upon it by the principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution. Such a court must take pains to interpret the state law as the state court would. If the court is unsure of the state law or the state has not addressed a particular issue, the court can certify a question for state court review. Rewriting the state law, however, is inappropriate. This, though, is exactly what the Second Circuit has done. The Second Circuit should revisit the issue and revitalize Weisman. 64 Id. at 751. . 1910)) ).
